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Investors with limited attention have an incentive to focus on summary statistics
rather than individual pieces of information. We use this observation to form a test
of the impact of limited attention on the aggregate stock market. We examine the
market response to a macroeconomic release that is purely a summary statistic, the
U.S. Leading Economic Index (LEI). Consistent with the limited attention hypothesis,
we show that the LEI announcement has an impact on aggregate stock returns, return
volatility, and trading volume. Furthermore, we nd evidence that the response to the
LEI is higher for stocks which inattentive investors are more likely to trade.
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11 Introduction
For most investors, the costs of processing all relevant information are prohibitively high.
As such, these investors can be viewed as having limited attention. Previous studies provide
evidence suggesting that investors' limited attention is important for the pricing of individual
securities. For example, DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) show that publicly available demo-
graphic information is not completely impounded in stock prices. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh
(2007) suggest that investors cannot process all the relevant information when many rms
release their earnings on the same day, leading to weaker stock price reaction. Huberman
and Regev (2001) document an instance where a re-release of news had a large eect on the
stock price of a biotech rm. In this paper, we ask whether limited attention also has a
systematic impact on the aggregate stock market.
To answer this question, we examine how the release of summary statistics aect the
market. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Peng and Xiong (2006) highlight that investors with
limited attention economize on information processing by grouping stocks into categories. In
the same spirit, investors with limited attention may choose to focus on summary statistics
instead of attending to every individual piece of information. This implication of limited
attention has not, to our knowledge, been tested in the previous literature.
The summary statistic we identify is The Conference Board's U.S. Leading Economic
Index (LEI). This index is designed to track business cycle uctuations and signal turning
points in the business cycle. It is economically relevant as it contains information about fu-
ture cash ows and discount rates, and it has a leading relationship relative to macroeconomic
aggregates such as output and employment. Like most macroeconomic announcements, the
LEI is released on a pre-determined schedule.
What makes the LEI an important variable in our context is that the components of the
composite index are publicly available or can be easily calculated using publicly available
data in advance of the announcement. In fact, several of the constituent macroeconomic
variables are usually released weeks before the LEI scheduled releases. Furthermore, the
methodology used to compile the LEI is also publicly available. These are well-known facts,
publicized among other places on The Conference Board's website and Bloomberg.1 It is
therefore possible to calculate the change in the index before its release. Based on semi-strong
market eciency, the announcement of the LEI should not impact market returns because
1See http://www.conference-board.org/economics/bci/general.cfm and
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/ecalendar/index.html
2the information in the component data relevant to fundamentals should already have been
incorporated in stock prices.
Our null hypothesis is that there should be no market reaction to the announcements
of the index since 1) the LEI is based on previously released data, 2) the components and
methodology of the LEI are readily available to the public, and 3) the index is fairly easy
to reproduce. However, if limited attention is important for the aggregate stock market,
the information in the LEI may be news to investors and as such have a market impact.
Further, if this market impact is caused by limited attention, we would expect to nd a
larger response among stocks in which investors subject to this bias are more likely to trade.
Looking at intraday data over 72 announcement days over the period 1997-2005, we nd
that the release of the LEI is associated with measures of information arrival such as market
returns, return volatility, and trading volume. The market return is positively related to the
changes in the LEI: A one standard deviation increase in the LEI on average leads to a 3.5
basis-point increase in the subsequent 5-minute market returns. Aggregate return volatility
and trading volume increase by 25% and 7%, respectively, following the announcement. The
volatility increase is signicant for the 5-minute interval following the announcement, while
the volume increase persists for the subsequent 30 minutes.
The absolute level of the return response is fairly low. However, this result is expected
given that limited attention should aect markets less if the information is market-wide, as
is the case here. Investors have a higher incentive to be attentive to information that is more
important for their utility and, as a group, investors therefore focus more on market-wide
information. Further, since the release is recurring and perfectly forecastable, one would
expect attentive arbitrageurs to eliminate prot opportunities arising from the release up
to transaction costs. Therefore, the tests in this paper are stacked against the alternative
hypothesis of limited attention. Nevertheless, when we use quote and volume data from the
SPDR (Spider) exchange-traded fund,2 we nd that a simple trading strategy, which goes
long (short) the market prior to positive (negative) LEI announcements, delivers on average
positive daily volume-weighted prots.
To examine the robustness of the results we test another hypothesis. If the market impact
of the LEI announcements is caused by limited attention of a subset of investors, we would
expect to nd a larger impact on stocks which investors subject to this bias are more likely
to trade. We test this conjecture by looking at the cross-sectional return response to the
LEI release. Barber and Odean (2006) show that individual investors focus on \attention-
2The Spider is an exchange-traded fund (ETF) designed to track the S&P500 Index.
3grabbing stocks", such as stocks that are featured in the media and stocks with high volume.
Large capitalization stocks tend to have higher volume and are more likely to be covered by
the media. Similarly, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that value strategies
produce superior returns because \naive" investors drive up the prices of \glamour" stocks
compared with \value" stocks. We would thus expect that inattention-prone investors are
more likely to trade large capitalization stocks as well as stocks with low book-to-market
ratios, which should therefore respond more strongly to the release of the LEI. We construct
intraday returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios on the announcement days and show
that, consistent with the limited attention eect, the returns of large capitalization stocks
respond more to the LEI announcements, compared to small capitalization stocks. The
estimated announcement response is higher for low book-to-market stocks than for high
book-to-market stocks, again consistent with the limited attention hypothesis, although this
dierence in response is not statistically signicant.
The impact of investors with limited attention on the valuation of nancial assets is
important because its existence and causes have implications for the eciency of nancial
markets. This paper is in that sense related to the large body of literature on market e-
ciency and more specically to studies that evaluate the impact of news about fundamentals
on asset prices.3 Our study contributes to the literature that relates limited attention to
market eciency along the following dimensions. First, our test is on the aggregate market
whereas much of the previous evidence of limited attention concerns company specic news
events: for example, Huberman and Regev (2001) and Meschke (2004) who nds that stock
prices and trading volume react to CNBC broadcasts of interviews with the relevant com-
pany's CEO. Second, since the LEI announcement is recurring monthly at a known time,
agents have the opportunity to learn about the nature of the announcement over time. We
do not nd evidence that the announcement eect is weaker in the latter part of the sample.
Third, the results are unlikely to be explained by risk. As an example, Liu, Whited and
Zhang (2007) propose a rational risk based explanation for the earnings-announcement drift
of Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Sloan (1996). However, our experiment has its draw-
backs: namely that the magnitude of the announcement response and the sample size are
relatively small. In summary, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that investors'
limited attention can give rise to violations of semi-strong market eciency at the aggregate
3Examples of such studies include Schwert (1981), Huberman and Schwert (1985), Cutler, Poterba, and
Summers (1989), and Mitchell and Mulherin (1994). Fama (1970, 1991) provides summaries of the market
eciency literature.
4market level.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the empirical tests.
Section 3 presents the aggregate stock market results, while Section 4 presents the cross-
sectional results. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The Data
In this study, we combine three dierent data sources: macroeconomic news, intraday index
prices and individual stock transactions. The LEI release dates and index series were pro-
vided by The Conference Board. It is important to note that we use the original release series
(subsequent revisions to macroeconomic data resulted in ex-post updates of the index). In
our sample (1/1997 - 8/2005), the index is always reported at 10:00am.4
The market returns data are constructed using S&P500 futures prices, while the cross-
sectional analysis uses individual stock transactions data from the NYES Trades and Quotes
(TAQ) database. The futures data were purchased from Price-Data.com and includes ve-
minute interval data on open, high, low, and close prices for each of the futures contacts
traded between 1997 and 2005. For each date, we determined which of the multiple contracts
available are \on-the-run" and constructed the intraday return series for each day using prices
from that day's on-the-run contract. Since aggregate intraday volume data is not readily
available, we constructed them by gathering tick-by-tick data from TAQ for all rms that
were in the S&P500 index on a given day. We added transactions across all rms for each
ve-minute interval to arrive at the market volume for that time period.
We use data from the Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve
Board, National Association of Purchasing Managers, and The Conference Board to screen
out all dates on which other macroeconomic announcements were released simultaneously
at 10:00am. The specic announcement are New Home Sales, Factory Orders, Construction
Spending, Business Inventories, Consumer Condence Index, NAPM Index, and the Target
Federal Funds Rate.5 Therefore, out of a total of 104 announcements in our sample (1/1997
- 8/2005), we exclude 30 due to the simultaneous macroeconomic releases and 2 due to
4Before 1997, the LEI was reported at 8:30am, which coincides with the reporting time for a number of
other macroeconomic releases (Nonfarm Payroll, Housing Starts, PPI, CPI, among others). The move to
the 10:00am announcement time reected in part a desire to make the announcement during market open
hours.
5These announcements were identied by Andersen et al. (2007) as having a signicant impact on S&P500
futures returns.
5unavailable futures prices at the time of the announcements.6
2.1 The Leading Economic Index
The Composite Index of Leading Economic Indicators (LEI), calculated and published
monthly by The Conference Board (TCB), is designed to predict turning points (peaks and
troughs) in the business cycle. TCB took over the responsibility to publish and maintain
the LEI and the Business Cycle Indicators database from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
starting with the December 6, 1995 release.7
Leading indicators are series that have an established tendency to decline before recessions
and rise before recoveries.8 For instance, new orders for machinery and equipment are placed
well before investment plans are completed. By design, the LEI should help predict changes
in real economic activity. Figure 1 shows that the LEI systematically declines ahead of the
recessions dated by the NBER. Filardo (2004) provides evidence that the LEI performs well
as a variable to forecast cyclical movements in the economy. McGuckin, Ozyildirim, and
Zarnowitz (2007) also report evidence on the signicant out-of-sample forecasting ability of
the LEI.
After TCB assumed responsibility for the Business Cycle Indicators program, it reviewed
and revised the LEI in 1996. Notably, the composition of the LEI was changed: Two
components were deleted due to their excessive volatility which led to \false signals" of
recessions and a new component was added (Interest Rate Spread). After this major revision
(rst released December 30, 1996), TCB also started to publish the LEI press release at
10:00am EST to be consistent with its other economic data releases. Previously, the LEI
releases were made at 8:30am, following the BEA schedule.
In the current indexing methodology, which changed very little since the 1960s when
the U.S. Department of Commerce began publishing composite indexes, the volatility of
each component is standardized before the component contributions are averaged together,
using equal weights. This adjustment is made so that relatively more volatile series do not
exert undue inuence on the index (the standardization factors are updated every year in
January and are available in the monthly press releases). The average contribution becomes
6We present results including all announcements days in Section 3.5.
7The indicator approach has a long history since the mid-1930s and was developed at the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER), following the inuential work of Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns.
It has been a major component of the NBER program on economic growth and uctuations.
8For more details on the indicator approach to measuring and analyzing business cycles, see Burns and
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The shaded areas represent U.S. busines cycle recessions as dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research.


























































See Business Cycle Indicators, The Conference Board, January 2006
Figure 1: Time series of the Leading Economic Index, the Coincident Index and Real GDP.
the monthly change in the LEI. Using this monthly change, the index level is calculated
recursively starting from a value of 100 in January 1959, and it is normalized to have an
average value of 100 in 1996.
Seven of the ten indicators used every month in the LEI calculation are available at least
24 hours before each release. The monthly values of the three remaining components which
are not available on the publication date are based on estimates by TCB. These components
(Manufacturers' New Orders for Consumer Goods and Materials, Manufacturers' New Orders
for Nondefense Capital Goods, and the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deator used
to get real Money Supply (M2)) are estimated using a simple AR(2) time series regression.9
9When the unavailable data become available in the next month, the index is revised.
7The Appendix provides more background information and details on why this procedure was
selected and how it was implemented by TCB.10
3 Market Level Results
This section presents the impact of the LEI announcements on aggregate measures of in-
formation arrival: stock returns, return volatility, and trading volume. Our null hypothesis
is that the LEI announcements have no eect. We focus on intraday market activity for
two reasons. First, previous research has shown that the eect of news on aggregate stock
market prices are mainly manifested in intraday returns data (Andersen et al. (2003, 2007)).
Second, focusing on intraday returns makes our study less sensitive to the presence of other
news eects over the same day (including the time from the close the day before) that we
may not have captured in our econometric specication.
3.1 General Methodology
A rst-order concern when evaluating high-frequency data is the well-known presence of
intraday patterns in volatility and volume (Admati and Peiderer (1988)). Rather than
attempt a parametric model to describe such patterns, for which at present there is no
agreed upon model, we investigate return and volatility patterns on LEI announcement days
vs. non-announcement days by utilizing a matching study. This allows us to control for both
intraday and day-of-the-week eects. Specically, we match each announcement date with
the one week ahead non-announcement date, unless there is another important macro news
release on that date, in which case we pick the date following the LEI release.
We evaluate the aggregate return, volatility and volume of announcement days versus
non-announcement days over dierent 5-minute intervals around the time of announcement
to investigate any pre- and post-announcement eects. The LEI release is at 10:00 through-
out the sample, and we focus on the 9:30 to 10:30 interval.11 Andersen et al. (2007) note
that looking at 5-minute futures returns strikes a good balance between capturing funda-
mental dynamics operating at high-frequencies and minimizing the noise in returns caused
by bid-ask bounce and other microstructure issues. The futures contracts on the S&P500
Index are extremely liquid, so empirically neither stale prices nor the bid-ask bounce are
10The Conference Board (2001) contains extensive details on these procedures.
11In the remainder of the paper, we use the 24:00 time convention when quoting time intervals. Thus,
10:00 is 10:00am.
8important issues for our purposes. Further, this approach allows us to compare our results
with those obtained in similar studies. For all intervals, we test whether there is a return
response at the time of the announcement and whether realized volatility are dierent on
announcement versus non-announcement days.
3.2 Returns
In this section, we investigate the eect of the LEI announcement on S&P500 futures' returns.
We rst dene the normalized change in the LEI index, LEIt, as
LEIt 
LEI indext   ET [LEI indext]
T (LEI indext)
(1)
where ET [] and T () denote the sample mean and standard deviation, respectively.
We make this normalization for two reasons: 1) it makes the interpretation of regression
coecients more intuitive, and 2) it makes the results easier to compare to related studies
where such normalizations are used.12 It is usual to subtract the conditional expectation
of the release and divide by the standard deviation of the imputed shocks. However, since
our index is replicable, there are no well-dened \shocks". Therefore, we simply consider
deviations from the sample mean.13






i LEIt + "
A
i;t where t 2 [1;2;:::;T] (2)
where RA
i;t is the intraday interval i's log return on the announcement day t. Thus, if the
interval i is before 10:00, the regressor is the same-day future percentage change in the LEI
index, whereas if the interval i is after 10:00, the regressor is the same day's already reported











where the superscript NA refers to the non-announcement day t0, which corresponds to
the matched announcement day t. A matching sample is not strictly needed for the return
12Note that because the sample means and standard deviations are constants, this normalization does not
aect the statistical signicance of the estimated response coecients.
13Under an alternative hypothesis that inattentive investors have formed an expectation of the LEI an-
nouncement but do not know its exact value, simply demeaning leads to an errors-in-variables problem which
would imply that our reported regression coecients are biased towards zero.
9regressions as the null hypothesis  = 0 is well-dened, but we nonetheless report the
regression results for non-announcement days to ensure that our results are not driven by
intra-day patterns in returns. Table 1 presents the results.
The regression coecients for the 5-minute intervals before the announcement (from 9:30-
10:00) are on average positive, but not signicant at the 5% level.14 The regression coecients
on non-announcement days are also insignicant and on average half as big as the case for
the announcement days. At the announcement (interval 10:00-10:05), the announcement day
regression coecient is positive and signicant at the 5% level, while the non-announcement
day regression coecient is about a quarter in magnitude and insignicant. Thus, the LEI
announcement is moving aggregate stock prices in the direction of the change in the LEI
index: A one standard deviation change in the LEI gives, on average, a 3.5bp return response
on the S&P500 futures.
The intercept in regression (2) is signicant and negative in the 10:00-10:05 interval on
announcement days. Since normalized LEI changes have zero mean, the sample average
return in this 5-minute interval is thus signicantly negative on the announcement days in
our sample. This is unexpected and not straightforward to explain. There are no notable
outliers in the return series and the median return is close to the mean return. To check
whether this fact aects the signicance of the LEI change, we run regression (2) at the
announcement without an intercept term (i.e. we are forcing the intercept to be zero) and
nd that the results are essentially unchanged: The regression coecient is in this case
0.0351, the t-statistic is 2.19 and the R2 is 4.9%.15 Therefore, the negative and signicant
intercept is not an important factor for the nding that the LEI announcement signicantly
aects contemporaneous S&P500 futures returns.
3.2.1 Return reversal
To assess whether the price impact around the LEI announcement is permanent or transitory,
we regress post-announcement returns from a telescoping return window, starting with the
10:05 to 10:10 return, then the 10:05 to 10:15 return, etc., until the 10:05 to 10:30 return,
on the LEI announcement. Table 2 displays the results.
The regression coecients are negative and increasing in absolute value and, in terms of
14It is interesting, however, to note that the coecient for the 9:35 - 9:40 interval regression on announce-
ment days is positive and marginally signicant (p-value of 0.06). It is in this interval The Conference Board
releases its announcement to the news agencies that report the release at 10:00.
15The regression coecient appears to be equal to the one obtained when including an intercept in the
regression. However, it is not equal before round-o.
10TABLE 1
Return Regressions
Ri;t0 t1 = i + iLEIt + "i;t
Time Announcement Days Non-Announcement Days
t0   t1   R2 p   val   R2 p   val
(s:e:) (s:e:) (s:e:) (s:e:)
9:30 - 9:35  :0047 :0180 2:09% 0:26  :0176 :0021 0:03% 0:87
(:0147) (:0160) (:0154) (:0132)
9:35 - 9:40 :0073 :0257 4:19% 0:06  :0166 :0285 3:34% 0:15
(:0146) (:0133) (:0182) (:0194)
9:40 - 9:45 :0115  :0144 1:57% 0:28  :0195 :0178 1:24% 0:33
(:0136) (:0132) (:0189) (:0181)
9:45 - 9:50 :0148 :0084 0:39% 0:62  :0137  :0081 0:31% 0:67
(:0159) (:0168) (:0173) (:0188)
9:50 - 9:55 :0125  :0147 1:43% 0:34 :0086  :0087 0:34% 0:66
(:0145) (:0152) (:0176) (:0199)
9:55 - 10:00 :0272 :0038 0:09% 0:82  :0033 :0125 0:97% 0:36
(:0150) (:0166) (:0150) (:0137)
10:00 - 10:05  :0437 :0351 5:33% 0:03  :0232 :0072 0:26% 0:69
(:0176) (:0162) (:0165) (:0177)
10:05 - 10:10  :0162  :0085 0:44% 0:58 :0264 :0019 0:03% 0:89
(:0152) (:0153) (:0134) (:0129)
10:10 - 10:15  :0185  :0090 0:45% 0:63 :0001 :0040 0:08% 0:80
(:0159) (:0184) (:0170) (:0152)
10:15 - 10:20  :0213  :0125 1:15% 0:29  :0291 :0025 0:05% 0:87
(:0138) (:0117) (:0140) (:0150)
10:20 - 10:25  :0377  :0020 0:03% 0:89  :0225  :0163 1:57% 0:31
(:0146) (:0144) (:0154) (:0160)
10:25 - 10:30  :0306  :0001 0:00% 0:95 :0035  :0044 0:11% 0:71
(:0136) (:0119) (:0161) (:0117)
Table 1: This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of S&P500 futures return on the same-
day normalized LEI announcement for announcement days, and matched LEI announcement for
non-announcement days. There are 72 observations in each group. Returns are multiplied by 100,
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (White standard errors). The changes in the
LEI index have been normalized to have mean zero and unit variance. * denotes signicant at the
10 percent level, while ** denotes signicant at the 5 percent level in a two-tailed test.
11TABLE 2
Return Reversal Regressions
Rt;t0 t1 = t0 t1 + t0 t1LEIt + "t;t0 t1
Start time End time for return calculation
10:05 to ... 10:10 10:15 10:20 10:25 10:30
 -0.0085 -0.0175 -0.0300 -0.0032 -0.0033
(std. error) (0.0153) (0.0223) (0.0233) (0.0317) (0.0324)
R2 0.0% 0.9% 1.8% 1.5% 1.1%
p-val 0.58 0.43 0.20 0.31 0.34
Table 2: This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of the S&P500 futures returns of a
telescoping return window on the same-day normalized LEI announcement for announcement days.
There are 72 observations. Returns are multiplied by 100 and standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity (White standard errors). The changes in the LEI index have been normalized to
have mean zero and unit variance. * denotes signicant at the 10 percent level, while ** denotes
signicant at the 5 percent level in a two-tailed test.
magnitudes, there appears to be a reversal in the return data. However, none of the regression
coecients are statistically signicant. Thus, the data unfortunately cannot reliably tell us
whether the return response is transitory or permanent, but only provides suggestive evidence
that the return response is transitory. Under this interpretation, the demand of inattentive
investors exerts temporary price pressure which is partly reversed over the latter half of the
event window. Under the permanent return response interpretation, the increased demand of
inattentive investors has a lasting eect on prices as these investors update their expectations
of economic conditions and thus their demand for risky assets.
3.2.2 Benchmarking Against Major Macro News Announcements
The return response documented in the previous section is small in magnitude. However,
when benchmarked against major macro economic news announcements such as Non-Farm
Payroll and New Home Sales, the response is comparable. Figure 2 shows the response of 5-
minute returns to the LEI announcement next to the statistically signicant 5-minute return
12responses to macro economic news announcements taken from Andersen et al. (2007).16
These authors run the same regressions as in our equation (2), also using S&P500 futures
returns, but with certain dierences in the data period and construction. Their sample period
is dierent from ours, 1994 to 2002 versus 1997 to 2006, but with a six-year overlap. Further,
Andersen et al. (2007) dene macro news announcements by subtracting conditional investor
expectations, obtained from survey data, from the actual announcement and then normalize
this news data so the standard deviation of each macro series is one. In our case, subtracting
such measures of investor expectations is not appropriate. Under the null hypothesis, the
expected value is equal to the announced value, so all \news" values would be zero. Instead,
we simply demean and normalize the announcements as they are reported. The comparison
of the regression coecients is therefore fair in that all series have unit variance, but we note
the caveats that the sample periods and the construction of the variables dier somewhat.
3.2.3 Trading Strategies
The results using the S&P500 futures returns are based on transaction prices. This raises
two questions. First, is the return response due to a bid-ask bounce? In this case, a high
LEI leads to buys at the ask, while a low LEI leads to sells at the bid, without the midpoint
of the bid and the ask prices actually changing. Second, even if midpoint prices are moving
in the direction of the LEI, which indicates failure of market eciency in the Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) sense, is the market response to the LEI within the bid-ask spread and thus
could not have been traded on?
Unfortunately, quotes data for the S&P500 futures for our sample period were is not
publicly available. Therefore, we turn the analysis to the SPDR (Spider): an exchange-
traded fund that tracks the S&P500 index (ticker symbol SPY). The price of the Spider
is 1/10 of the index level and ranges from $80 to $153 in the sample period. Intraday
trades and quotes on the Spider can be obtained from the NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ)
database. This data allows us to run return regressions based on index prices determined as
the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, as well as evaluate trading strategies taking into account
16Andersen et al. (2007) investigate all macro releases including the LEI, but do not nd signicant
evidence that it has a price impact. We oer two explanations for the discrepancy between our results.
First, in their Table 4, they state that the LEI is released at 8:30am. This is true only for the beginning of
their sample. In our sample, from 1997 and onwards, the release time is always at 10:00am. At present we
do not know if the authors corrected the change in release time over the sample, but they give no indication
in their paper that they do. Second, and more fundamentally, they investigate normalized \surprises" based
on market estimates obtain from a survey database (MMS). As we discuss above, it is unclear what these
\shocks" represent since the index is perfectly forecastable.
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Figure 2: This gure shows the signicant ve-minute S&P500 futures return response to macroe-
conomic news announcements from Andersen et al. (2007) next to the ve-minute return response
to the normalized LEI announcement from Table 1.
bid-ask spreads. We use standard lters to clean the TAQ data.17 The trading strategies are
only suggestive as we cannot know if the prescribed trades would have moved the subsequent
bid and ask prices had they been executed. We also ignore any fees, such as brokerage fees,
incurred when trading.
Table 3 shows the regression of midpoint returns on the Spider on the normalized LEI
announcement. As for the S&P500 futures return, the 10:00 - 10:05 return regression gives a
positive an statistically signicant (at the 5% level) regression coecient. Again the intercept
is statistically signicant and negative. However, the results are in fact stronger if we force
the intercept to be zero.18 For no other 5-minute interval is the coecient signicant. Thus,
the results using prices based on the midpoint conrm the nding in Table 1 for the S&P500
futures return, and we conclude that the regression results are not due to a bid-ask bounce
17We apply the following lters to clean the trade and quote data (Hendershott and Moulton (2007)). We
use only trades for which TAQ's CORR eld is equal to zero, one, or two and for which the COND eld
is either blank or equal to @, E, F, I, J, or K. We eliminate trades with nonpositive prices or quantities.
We eliminate trades with prices more than (less than) 150% (50%) of the previous trade price. We use only
quotes for which TAQ's MODE eld is equal to 1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, or 26. We eliminate quotes
with nonpositive price or size or with bid price greater than ask price. We exclude quotes when the quoted
spread is greater than 25% of the quote midpoint or when the ask price is more than 150% of the bid price.
18We also regress the 10:00 - 10:05 return on the normalized LEI change without an intercept term. The
regression coecient in this case increases to 0:033, with a t-statistic of 2:04.
14TABLE 3
Spider Midpoint Return Regressions
RSPY
i;t0 t1 = i + iLEIt + "i;t
Time Announcement Days
t0   t1   R2 p-value
(s:e:) (s:e:)
9 : 30   9 : 35  :069  :039 1:5% 0:40
(:042) (:045)
9 : 35   9 : 40  :003 :020 2:9% 0:12
(0:015) (0:013)
9 : 40   9 : 45 0:016 0:002 0:0% 0:87
(0:017) (0:012)
9 : 45   9 : 50 0:026 0:005 0:1% 0:80
(0:019) (0:019)
9 : 50   9 : 55 0:001  0:013 1:3% 0:33
(0:015) (0:013)
9 : 55   10 : 00 0:049 0:011 0:6% 0:56
(0:020) (0:019)
10 : 00   10 : 05  0:052 0:032 4:7% 0:05
(0:020) (0:016)
10 : 05   10 : 10 0:020 0:012 0:3% 0:66
(0:027) (0:027)
10 : 10   10 : 15  0:014  0:017 0:6% 0:59
(0:029) (0:032)
10 : 15   10 : 20  0:089  0:011 0:2% 0:75
(0:037) (0:036)
10 : 20   10 : 25  0:040  0:033 1:4% 0:40
(0:038) (0:039)
10 : 25   10 : 30  0:116  0:028 0:6% 0:56
(0:045) (0:047)
Table 3: This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of the Spider ve-minute returns on
the same-day normalized LEI announcement for announcement days. The number of observations
vary between 63 and 69, as there are a few instances early in the sample where the Spider does
not trade in the relevant ve-minute interval. Returns are multiplied by 100 and standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity (White standard errors). The change in the LEI has been
normalized to have mean zero and unit variance. * denotes signicant at the 10 percent level, while
** denotes signicant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.
15but are instead the consequence of fundamental price changes.
We now ask whether trading strategies based on the LEI release can be protable after
accounting for transaction costs as implied by the bid-ask spread. Panel A of Table 4 shows
the average nominal bid-ask spread for the Spider in the rst hour of market open as well as
for the interval 9:55 - 10:05 for each year in the sample. The average nominal bid-ask spread
decreases strongly between 2001 and 2003, while volume increases. In the rst part of the
sample, the average bid-ask spread is roughly 20 basis points of the price, whereas in the
last half of the sample the average bid-ask spread is about 3 basis points of the price. The
bid-ask spread will naturally aect the protability of a trading strategy, and we therefore
focus on both the full sample, 1997   2005, and the second half, 2002   2005.
We rst consider a return-based measure of the protability of trading on the LEI release.
To ensure robustness of the results, we consider a range of trading strategies constructed as
follows. We start trading at a given time before 10:00 and trade an equal dollar amount every
minute up until, but not including, 10:00. We then hold this portfolio until 10:05, when we
unload the entire position. The trade is in the direction of the LEI change: If the release is
above average, we start buying the Spider before the announcement and sell at 10:05, and
vice versa. Buys are made at the then available ask, while sells are made at the bid. To
avoid using future information, we let the average of the LEI change, which determines the
threshold between buys and sells, be equal to its long-run historical median using data up
until 1997 (which is 0.1). Note that this cut-o point leads to an equal number of long versus
short days. This is important as the intercept eects discussed earlier are in this case not a
concern.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the average returns from this strategy. As is apparent, the
average announcement day return for the full sample is negative and about -5 basis points.
However, for the latter part of the sample, the returns become positive: about 5 basis points
if trading commences between 9:30 and 9:45, and decreasing afterwards. The change in
trading strategy returns between the two samples is due to the change in bid-ask spreads,
which are much higher in the rst half of the sample. Given that the return response is
fairly low, high bid-ask spreads lead to negative returns. Further, the bid-ask spread closer
to 10:00 is slightly higher than the average for the hour, which partly explain the lower
returns for the trading strategies that start at 9:50 and 9:55.
Panel C of Table 4 shows the average announcement-day dollar prots from a volume-
weighted trading strategy using the available bid and ask prices. Instead of trading an
equal amount in the interval from the given start time until, but not including, 10:00, we
16TABLE 4
Spider Trading Strategies
Panel A: Bid-Ask Spreads and 5-Minute Average Volume
9:30 - 10:30 9:55 - 10:05
Year Bid-Ask Volume Bid-Ask Volume
1997 0.182 63,431 0.194 58,343
1998 0.170 106,110 0.155 117,783
1999 0.324 88,704 0.525 114,214
2000 0.213 120,999 0.200 150,325
2001 0.216 278,935 0.155 262,114
2002 0.100 468,839 0.135 498,917
2003 0.048 549,987 0.048 629,008
2004 0.042 327,091 0.044 272,965
2005 0.028 541,598 0.037 490,544
Panel B: Trading Strategy: Returns Net of Bid-Ask Spread
1997 - 2005 2002 - 2005







Panel C: Trading Strategy: $ Prot Net of Bid-Ask Spread
1997 - 2005 2002 - 2005






9:55 $   2;037 $3;853
Table 4: Panel A reports the average nominal bid-ask spread and average 5-minute volume for
each year in the sample for the given time period. The price of the Spider ranged between $80 and
$153 in this period so, to give an example, the average bid-ask spread in 2005 was about 2.5 basis
points. Panel B shows the average return to the trading strategy based on bid and ask prices, while
Panel C shows the average prots of the volume-weighted trading strategy. The trading strategies
are conducted both over the full sample and over the sub-period 2002-2005 (after 2001 there was a
large drop in the bid-ask spreads which increases the protability of the trading strategies).
17now trade a number of Spider shares equal to half the volume in a given minute, which we
assume is the number of buys or sells in each minute. At 10:05, we begin unloading the
shares - again according to half the volume in each minute thereafter, until we hold no more
shares. If we still have shares left at 10:29, the remainder of the position is assumed to be
liquidated at 10:29 prices. While this trading strategy gives the maximal amount of trading
that would have been possible, it is easy to scale: If trading only 1/5 of half of the volume
seems more reasonable, one can simply divide the dollar prots we report by ve. Panel
C shows that for the full sample, the average announcement day trading prot is $44,062
if trading starts at market open. If instead trading starts at 9:55am, the strategy leads to
an average daily loss of $2,037. While the latter loss seems consistent with the reported
negative return from the full sample reported in Panel B, the gain if one starts trading at
the open does not. However, higher volume is accompanied by lower bid-ask spread in the
data. Thus, the volume-weighted trading strategy in eect takes advantage of periods with
lower bid-ask spreads - both within the hour and, more importantly for these results, across
time. The results for the 2002-2005 period conrms this. Here volume is higher, bid-ask
spreads are lower and the dollar prots are consistently positive, ranging from $157,071 per
announcement day if trading commences at market open, to $3,853 if trading starts at 9:55.
Thus, using historical data on available bid and ask prices for the Spider ETF, we show
that the market response to the LEI release gives rise to protable hypothetical trading
strategies, especially in the latter half of the sample when the bid-ask spreads were markedly
lower. However, we do not claim that these trades were in fact feasible as that would
require estimating the market impact of additional trades. At the same time, this analysis
excludes parallel trades that an arbitrageur may have also been able to execute protably in
other instruments, such as the S&P500 futures. Further, we assume that the hypothetical
trader does not consider the size of the bid-ask spread when implementing the trades. A
complete evaluation would therefore have to take into account all assets that respond to the
announcement as well as estimates of their trading costs. We conclude that while it may be
that the prot opportunities documented here, if acted upon, would have been close to no-
arbitrage bounds, the results in Table 4 suggest that the magnitude of the market response
to the LEI release is economically signicant.
183.3 Volatility
In this Section, we test whether ve-minute stock return volatility is higher on announcement
days compared to non-announcement days in each of the ve-minute intervals in the hour
around the announcement.
It is well-documented that aggregate stock return volatility is time-varying. To control
for this, we employ a matching study. First, we calculate the volatility of ve-minute returns
for each non-announcement day for the relevant trading hour. Next, we divide the ve-
minute returns on both the corresponding announcement day and the non-announcement
day by this volatility measure.19 We use only the non-announcement days' volatility in order
to capture any overall higher levels of volatility on announcement days in the subsequent
volatility tests. This normalization is valid under the null hypothesis that the volatility over
matched announcement and non-announcement days are equal.
Next, we calculate the volatility of ve-minute (normalized) announcement and non-
announcement day returns for each interval as follows. Let ~ Ri;t be the normalized ve-
minute log return for the interval i, where i 2 f9:30-9:35, 9:35-9:40, ..., 10:25-10:30g. Interval











where the subscript t corresponds to the announcement or non-announcement days in our
sample, which are indexed 1 to 72. To test whether the variance on announcement days is
dierent than on non-announcement days, we apply a Levene F-test for each interval i.20
Column 2 in Table 5 shows the results. The ratios of announcement vs. non-announcement
days' volatility exhibit a signicant spike for the interval 10:00-10:05, which corresponds to
the time the LEI index is announced. The increase is not only statistically signicant (at the
5% level), but also economically sizable { volatility increases by an average of 25%. Before
10:00, there appears to be no overall pattern in the volatility ratio: volatility is about the
same on announcement vs. non-announcement days. There is one statistically signicant
19We calculate standard deviations assuming the expected ve-minute returns are equal to zero. This is
a standard assumption given the short time-interval and yields more robust volatility estimates. Using the
residuals of a regression of intraday returns on their lagged value (to capture any bid-ask bounce, which we
do not nd signicant) does not produce qualitatively dierent results.
20It is common in empirical work to use modied Levene F-tests (for example the Brown-Forsythe modied
Levene-test), as these are generally more robust to departures from normality of returns. We assume the
expected ve-minute return is equal to zero, which is neither the sample mean, median nor the 10% trimmed
mean, but which empirically turns out to be very close to the median.
19TABLE 5
Return Volatility and Volume Ratios
t0   t1 V olatility Ratio V olume Ratio
(p   value) (p   value)
9 : 30   9 : 35 1:186 0:978
(0:23) (0:46)
9 : 35   9 : 40 0:785 1:016
(0:02) (0:64)
9 : 40   9 : 45 0:934 1:049
(0:72) (0:14)
9 : 45   9 : 50 1:146 1:031
(0:41) (0:31)
9 : 50   9 : 55 0:963 1:048
(0:90) (0:10)

9 : 55   10 : 00 1:179 1:046
(0:27) (0:19)
10 : 00   10 : 05 1:252 1:068
(0:05) (0:04)
10 : 05   10 : 10 1:133 1:067
(0:46) (0:03)
10 : 10   10 : 15 1:037 1:070
(0:93) (0:03)
10 : 15   10 : 20 1:326 1:071
(0:01) (0:04)
10 : 20   10 : 25 1:017 1:071
(0:98) (0:02)
10 : 25   10 : 30 1:240 1:099
(0:10) (0:00)
Table 5: This table reports estimates of standard deviation of normalized 5-minute returns and
5-minute volume on announcement and non-announcement days. There are 72 observations in each
group. The variance ratio test is a Levene F-test, where zero is assumed to be the median/mean
return. The volume ratio is regressed on a constant. The null hypothesis is  = 1. Standard
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (White standard errors). * denotes signicance at the
10 percent level, while ** denotes signicance at the 5 percent level in a two-tailed test.
20observation at 9:35-9:40 for which announcement days seem to have lower volatility than
non-announcement days. After 10:00, the volatility ratios are all above 1, indicating that
volatility is overall higher on announcement days in the half hour following the LEI release.
3.4 Volume
In this Section, we test whether volume is higher on announcement days compared to non-
announcement days in each of the ve-minute intervals in the hour around the announcement.
To control for the strong increase in aggregate volume over the sample period and the
well known intraday patterns in volume, we create normalized ve-minute volume for each
announcement day, vi;t, by dividing the volume of the same ve-minute interval on the
matched non-announcement day:
vi;t =
volume 5 min interval i on announcement day t
volume 5 min interval i on non-announcement day t0: (5)
We then regress this normalized volume on a constant for each 5-minute interval from market
open at 9:30 until 10:30:
vi;t = i + "i;t where i 2 f9:30-9:35, 9:35-9:40, ..., 10:25-10:30g (6)
The null hypothesis we are testing is  = 1. Column 3 of Table 5 reports the results.
At market open the volume on non-announcement days is slightly higher than on non-
announcement days, but the dierence is insignicant. However, as we get closer to the
10:00 announcement, the volume ratio becomes larger than unity. It is larger than unity and
statistically signicant following the announcement, as it was for both returns and volatility.
The volume eect, however, persists signicantly throughout the half hour following the
announcement.
3.5 Robustness
To examine the robustness of the results, we repeat the same analysis on the full set of
announcement days. Recall that we initially excluded days on which other macro announce-
ments were released. The full sample consists of 102 announcement days in the sample period
January 1997 to August 2005. If the full sample is aected by the presence of other macro
announcements, we would expect to nd a weaker return response but a stronger volatility
21and volume responses to the LEI announcements.
We nd that the LEI announcement has very similar impact on aggregate stock market
returns, volatility and volume, compared with the ltered sample. Specically, we nd that
the return response at the time of the announcement (10:00 - 10:05) is positively related to
the change in the LEI, although the coecient is slightly smaller (0.028) and its statistical
signicance is weaker (t-statistic of 1.74). This is to be expected as the other announcements
are imperfectly correlated with changes in the LEI index and therefore add noise.
In contrast to the return tests which depend on the sign of the announcement, volatility
and volume are aected by the presence of other announcements. Indeed, we nd that
volatility increases by 28% following the announcement, which is stronger than for the ltered
sample (25%) where the LEI is the only announcement that occurs. The same applies to
trading volume. It increases by 8.8% following the announcement for the full sample, relative
to 6.8% in the ltered sample.
3.6 Discussion of Aggregate Results
In sum, we show that the LEI announcements have a signicant impact on aggregate proxies
of information arrival such as returns, return volatility, and trading volume. The eect is
short-lived for returns and volatility, consistent with previous studies of the impact of news
announcements on aggregate prices. Volume, however, exhibits a more prolonged reaction.
These ndings are consistent with the presence of investors with limited attention, who nd
it optimal to focus on summary statistics as opposed to the individual components of the
index.
The absolute level of the return response is fairly low. However, this result is expected
given that limited attention should aect markets less if the information is market-wide, as
is the case here. Investors have a higher incentive to be attentive to information that is more
important for their utility and, as a group, investors therefore focus more on market-wide
information. Further, since the release is recurring and replicable, one may expect attentive
arbitrageurs to eliminate prot opportunities arising from the release up to transaction costs.
Therefore, it is surprising that the LEI announcement has any signicant market impact
which, at least for the latter half of the sample, exceeds our measures of transaction costs of
trading.
224 Cross-Sectional Test
In the previous section, we showed that the release of the LEI has a statistically signicant
impact on aggregate returns, volatility, and volume. To examine the robustness of the results
we test another hypothesis. If the market impact of the LEI announcements are caused by
limited attention of a subset of investors, we would expect to nd a larger impact on stocks
which investors subject to this bias are likely to trade. We test this conjecture by looking
at the cross-sectional return response to the LEI release. Inattention-prone investors are
more likely to trade large capitalization stocks, which have high volume and are featured
more in the news (Barber and Odean (2006)), and stocks which have low book-to-market
ratios (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)). Thus, limited attention suggests that
large capitalization and low book-to-market stocks should respond more strongly to the
release of the LEI. We construct intraday returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios on the
announcement days and show that, consistent with the limited attention eect, the returns
of large capitalization and, to a lesser extent, low book-to-market stocks respond more to
the LEI announcements, compared to small and high book-to-market stocks.
4.1 Portfolio Construction
Following the procedure described in Davis, Fama, and French (2000), we obtain the CUSIP
numbers of the stocks in each of the 25 portfolios for every month from 1997 to 2005.21 We
then extract from the TAQ database the transactions of every stock in each portfolio from
9:30 until 10:30 on the LEI announcement days, and construct 1-minute interval returns.
Calculation of portfolio returns using tick-by-tick data poses a challenge since many
stocks do not trade frequently. To control for the eect stale prices may have, we use the
following algorithm. For the time interval (for example 10:00 - 10:01), a stock's return is
calculated if it traded during that minute and during the preceding minute (9:59 - 10:00). If
a stock trades multiple times during both minutes, we use the latest trades in both minutes
in order to calculate the return. The stocks that do not trade during either or both minutes
are disregarded. The portfolio return is the equally-weighted return of all the stocks' returns
that did trade between these two minutes. In Section 4.3, we discuss further the properties
of this selection criteria.
21The only dierence between their procedure and ours is due to the fact that we do not have the hand-
collected data from Moody's Industrial Manuals that were used in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). We do
not believe that this creates any systematic bias in our analysis.
23Some summary statistics for all 25 portfolios are shown in Table 7 in the Appendix. It is
worth pointing out that the average numbers of stocks in our portfolios are consistent with
the data provided by Ken French on the daily 55 portfolios. Also, note that none of the
portfolios have very few stocks trading during the minute when the LEI announcements are
made: the minimum is 20 stocks and that is in the large size portfolios, where there is ample
liquidity and each stock trades frequently. In the small size portfolios, which might be most
subject to liquidity and stale price problems, there are always enough stocks trading between
10:00 and 10:01, the minimum being 54. Lastly, we highlight the fact that the average 1-
minute returns during the event window (9:30 - 10:30) are not statistically dierent from
zero across all portfolios, which gives us condence that these high-frequency returns are not
biased in any particular way.
4.2 Tests and Results
The limited attention hypothesis suggests that large and low book-to-market stocks should
have a higher announcement eect compared to small and high book-to-market stocks. In
order to test this hypothesis, we use intraday returns on 55 size and book-to-market sorted
portfolio described above and we regress the return of each portfolio from 10:00 to 10:01 on
the normalized change in the LEI:
Ri;10:00 10:01 = i + i  LEIt + "i;t for all 72 dates in our sample (7)
where Ri;10:00 10:01 is the return of portfolio i from 10:00 to 10:01.
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results from the above regressions. Three main patterns
emerge from this analysis. First, the regression coecients are positive for almost all port-
folios, consistent with the aggregate results presented in the previous section. Second, for
each book-to-market quintile, the regression coecient i tends to be bigger for larger size
portfolios, which suggests that there is a bigger announcement eect for large stocks. For
instance, for the medium book-to-market category (column 3), the coecient goes from be-
ing negative and insignicant for the smallest size portfolio to being positive and signicant
for largest size portfolio.
To investigate whether this size eect is statistically signicant, we rst construct aggre-
gate size quintile portfolios (one-way sort on size). Second, we regress the announcement
returns of a portfolio that is long the largest size quintile and short the smallest size quintile
on the LEI announcement. The resulting regression statistics are shown in Panel B of Table
24TABLE 6
Cross-Sectional Return Regressions
Panel A: Ri;10:00 10:01 = i + i  LEIt + "i;t
Book-to-Market
L 2 3 4 H
S -0.0147 0.0084 -0.0031 0.0237 -0.0171
(0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0137) (0.0111) (0.0187)
2 0.0128 -0.0027 0.0070 0.0096 0.0101
(0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0072) (0.0057) (0.0081)
Size 3 0.0209 0.0094 0.0040 0.0032 0.0056
(0.0087) (0.0062) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0070)
4 0.0188 0.0148 0.0144 0.0156 0.0137
(0.0103) (0.0072) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0117)
B 0.0305 0.0256 0.0243 0.0222 0.0184
(0.0113) (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0072) (0.0089)
Panel B: Ri   Rj = ij + ij  LEIt + "ij;t
Specication Category Ri Rj ij ij R2
adj
1 Size Big Small 0:0013 0:0248 10:7%
(0:0085) (0:0092)
2 Book-to- Low High  0:0032 0:0075 1:5%
Market (0:0072) (0:0081)
Table 6: Panel A of the table reports i coecient estimates from OLS regressions of return data for
each of the 25 Fama-French portfolios from 10:00 to 10:01 on the same-minute LEI announcement.
There are 72 observations in each group. Returns are multiplied by 100 and standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity (White standard errors). The change in LEI is normalized to have
mean zero and unit variance. ** denote statistical signicance at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.
Panel B shows the dierences in portfolio returns for four \corner" portfolios created by one-way
sorts along the size and book-to-market directions.
256, specication 1. The regression coecient is positive and signicant at the 5% level with
an R2 of 10:7%. Thus, large capitalization stocks react more strongly to the release of the
LEI than small capitalization stocks.
The third pattern that emerges from Panel A of Table 6 is that, as book-to-market
increases, the regression coecient i tends to decrease, i.e. the LEI announcement eect is
smaller. To assess whether this book-to-market pattern is statistically signicant, we do the
same test across book-to-market quintile portfolios as we did across the size portfolios. In
particular, we construct aggregate book-to-market sorted quintile portfolios and test whether
a portfolio that is long the lowest book-to-market quintile and short the highest book-to-
market quintile has a signicant return response to the announcement. Specication 2 of
Panel B in Table 6 reports the corresponding regression statistics. The regression coecient
is positive, as expected, but not statistically signicant.22 Thus, we do not nd signicant
evidence of an unconditional book-to-market eect.
In sum, we nd strong evidence that large capitalization stocks respond more strongly to
the LEI announcement compared to small capitalization stocks, but only suggestive evidence
on the relationship between book-to-market and the announcement response.
4.3 Liquidity, Bid-Ask Spreads, and the Bid-Ask Bounce
Could the cross-sectional results be explained by dierences in liquidity across the portfolios?
After all, spreads and bid-ask bounce are higher for small market capitalization stocks. We
argue that this would lead us to over-reject the null. To see that, consider a day with a
positive LEI announcement. Since prices respond to the announcement, we are likely to
observe an increase in orders executed at the ask price. For small stocks, which have large
bid-ask spread, the bid-ask bounce would generate \extra" returns compared to large stocks
that have smaller bid-ask spreads. As a result, eects related to bid-ask spreads and bounce
go against our results.
Another possible explanation for the lower observed announcement response for small
stocks is that they are more illiquid compared to large stocks. However, in the construction
of the 1-minute returns to the 25 Fama-French portfolios, we only take into account the
stocks that trade in both the 9:59 - 10:00 minute and the 10:00 - 10:01 minute. As a result,
stale prices do not lead to any systematic biases in the constructed portfolio returns. Table
22In regressions (not reported in the paper) we nd that the regression coecient on high minus low
book-to-market portfolios are consistently positive but not statistically signicant for all size quintiles.
267 in the Appendix shows that there are many stocks trading in each portfolio at the time of
the announcement, supporting the idea that the portfolios are well-diversied. Table 8 in the
Appendix provides further evidence that this procedure does not lead us to disregard stocks
in a way that would systematically bias our portfolio returns. We report the percentage of
minutes in the 9:30 - 10:30 hour during which a stock traded, conditional on the fact that
it did (rst panel) or did not (second panel) trade during the announcement minute. The
dierences are large across all portfolios and suggest that the stocks we disregard are more
illiquid stocks in general, and not just during our interval of concern (10:00 - 10:01).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present evidence that investors act on summary information, impacting
aggregate stock market returns, volatility and volume. The paper uses a weak restriction
on aggregate prices to test for the presence of limited investor attention: Markets should
not respond to the release of summary statistics that are based on information already
available. We identify a unique stream of releases, the U.S. Leading Economic Index (LEI),
that is released on an ongoing basis at pre-determined times, consists of previously published
macro data, is calculated using a publicly available methodology, and is widely followed by
the mass media. We show that this series has statistically signicant eects on proxies for
information arrival such as instantaneous market-level returns (which move in the direction
of the announcement), return volatility, and trading volume.
Since the test pertains to aggregate information, the eects of limited attention on returns
should be constrained by information gathering incentives and arbitrageurs. Peng and Xiong
(2006) show that investors with a limited attention choose to expend a larger fraction of their
resources on aggregate information, such as the index constituents of the LEI. Further, since
the LEI is released every month at a pre-determined time and date, it is relatively easy for
arbitrageurs to prot from a market return reaction to its release. Therefore, if investors
suer from limited attention, the market return impact should still be small, which is what
we nd. However, the other proxies for the arrival of information, volatility of volume,
increase substantially following the announcement. Thus, the evidence provided in this
paper indicates that summary statistics like the LEI are valuable to a signicant fraction
of investors, even though the information provided is technically stale. More broadly, this
suggests a role for other summaries of information such as the ones provided by the nancial
press.
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306 Appendix
6.1 LEI Calculation
Let LEIt;t 1 denote the monthly change in the LEI for month t 1 published in month t.
This monthly change is calculated as the sum of component contributions which are derived










where i is the standardization factor calculated by dividing the inverse standard deviation
of component i by the sum of the inverse standard deviations over all components. As the
notation makes clear, the index published in month t refers to past data for t 1 which has
already been published.
Since January 2001, leading indicator components for month t 1 that are not available
at the time of publication, month t, are estimated by TCB using a univariate autoregressive
model to forecast each unavailable component. This procedure seeks to address the problem
of varying availability in its components (publication lags). Without it, the index would
contain incomplete components or it would not be available promptly under the current
schedule.
In the publication schedule prior to January 2001, the index published in month t referred
to the month t   2. In the new schedule after January 2001, the index published in month
t refers to the preceding month t   1 (this information is available from The Conference
Board). For example, in the old publication schedule the index would be calculated in the
rst week of March (t) for January (t   2), and the January value of the LEI would use
a complete set of components. According the new schedule, the index is calculated in the
third week of March for February (t   1), and the February value of the index uses 70% of
the components which are already available and remaining 30% are forecast. As seen in this
example, users of the LEI would have had to wait for two more weeks until April for the
February index.
The missing components (Manufacturers' New Orders for Consumer Goods and Materi-
als, Manufacturers' New Orders for Nondefense Capital Goods, and the personal consump-
tion expenditure used to deate the Money Supply (M2) are estimated using a time series
regression that uses two lags (see McGuckin, Ozyildirim, and Zarnowitz (2001) for more on
31this model and a comparison with other alternative lag structures). The procedure used
to estimate the current month's Personal Consumption Expenditure Deator (used in the
calculation of Real Money Supply and Commercial and Industrial Loans Outstanding) in-
corporates the current month's Consumer Price Index when it is available before the release
of the LEI. When the unavailable data become available in the next month, the index is
revised.
The missing components could be forecast through alternative means. However, The
Conference Board has focused on simplicity, stability, and low costs of production and argues
for concentrating on easily implemented autoregressive model. Note that under the pre-
2001 release schedule of the LEI, it would have been possible to perfectly forecast the new
value each month just by collecting the individual data components and following the index
calculation methodology. In the post-2001 schedule, this is still possible, but the estimated
components require one additional step.
32TABLE 7
Descriptive Statistics of the Intraday Fama-French Portfolios
Portfolio # r1 min (%) 1 min (%) Nportfolio Nt;LEI
1 -0.00617 0.19262 580 93
2 -0.00409 0.24114 433 59
3 -0.00354 0.20421 505 54
4 -0.00408 0.22387 675 55
5 0.00337 0.20218 960 69
6 -0.00372 0.10093 201 82
7 -0.000737 0.10228 156 62
8 0.00282 0.13706 158 54
9 0.0037 0.15862 149 49
10 0.01208 0.61251 91 30
11 -0.00028 0.10274 163 91
12 -0.00174 0.07271 119 62
13 0.000509 0.07263 105 53
14 0.00196 0.08177 82 41
15 0.0015 0.09624 47 24
16 -0.00227 0.07047 138 102
17 0.00108 0.1789 100 68
18 0.00244 0.12944 78 50
19 0.000728 0.05695 54 35
20 0.000566 0.08681 36 19
21 -0.000876 0.07975 158 144
22 0.00164 0.1503 78 63
23 -0.000564 0.0771 50 37
24 0.000232 0.05572 36 28
25 -0.000134 0.06687 28 20
Table 7: For each of the 25 Fama-French portfolios, we report the average 1-minute returns r over
the hour from 9:30 to 10:30 along with the respective standard deviations of returns . We also
report the average number of stocks in each portfolio Nportfolio and the average number of stocks
Nt;LEI trading from 10:00 to 10:01 in each portfolio. All these summary statistics are for our entire
dataset of 72 dates spanning from February 1997 to August 2005. Note that the idiosyncratic
nature of the returns and standard deviations of portfolio 10 seems to be due to an error in the
TAQ data. We can conrm that this potential error does not occur between 10:00 and 10:01.
33TABLE 8
Liquidity of Stocks during the Announcement Hour
Stocks with trade at 10:00-10:01
Book-to-Market
L 2 3 4 H
S 45.78 41.34 36.36 34.85 34.96
2 61.50 55.32 51.23 47.71 49.80
Size 3 70.66 63.23 61.41 60.28 61.15
4 80.19 73.99 71.60 72.45 73.18
B 91.68 86.95 86.41 84.60 82.98
Stocks without trade at 10:00-10:01
Book-to-Market
L 2 3 4 H
S 15.83 13.19 11.37 9.89 9.35
2 33.57 27.79 25.59 26.41 26.29
Size 3 45.20 37.22 36.94 36.16 39.40
4 54.30 45.30 45.86 46.24 35.38
B 56.32 53.18 48.16 45.45 41.09
Table 8: This table shows the percentage of minutes in the 9:30 - 10:30 hour during which a stock
did trade. The rst panel shows this percentage conditional on the stock having traded during the
10:00 - 10:01 minute. The second panel shows this percentage conditional on the stock not having
traded during the 10:00 - 10:01 minute. The percentages presented are averaged across all stocks
and all 72 announcement dates within each portfolio.
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